Radical Shareholder Primacy by Millon, David
University of St. Thomas Law Journal 
Volume 10 
Issue 4 Spring 2013 Article 5 
January 2013 
Radical Shareholder Primacy 
David Millon 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, millond@wlu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.stthomas.edu/ustlj 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013 (2013). 
Available at: https://ir.stthomas.edu/ustlj/vol10/iss4/5 
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by UST Research Online and the University of 
St. Thomas Law Journal. For more information, please contact lawjournal@stthomas.edu. 
ARTICLE
RADICAL SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
DAVID MILLON*
Shareholder primacy, a term familiar to all corporate law academics, is
the idea that corporate management’s primary responsibility is to promote
the economic interests of shareholders. Regard for the corporation’s various
non-shareholder constituencies—including workers, creditors, suppliers,
consumers, and the local communities in which the company operates—or
for society more generally must not compromise the primary obligation to
its shareholders. This conception of management’s role and of the share-
holders’ privileged place among the firm’s many stakeholders contrasts
with other models. For example, some have argued that management’s job
is to balance or mediate the potentially conflicting interests of the different
stakeholder groups.1 Others would emphasize the importance of minimizing
social costs.2 It can also be argued that corporations have an affirmative
duty to contribute to the improvement of society, even if that comes at the
expense of corporate profits and shareholder wealth.3 All of these theories
share a rejection of the idea that shareholder interests should take priority
over those of other stakeholders or of society more generally.
In this article, I argue that there are two versions of the shareholder
primacy idea. I label one version “radical shareholder primacy” because it
makes an extreme claim about the nature of the shareholders’ privileged
position within the corporation. This version of shareholder primacy asserts
that corporate management is the agent of the shareholders and as such
* J.B. Stombock Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. The author gratefully
acknowledges financial support from the Frances Lewis Law Center, excellent research assistance
by John Eller, Reference Librarian, and Nancy Anderson and Brian Buckmire, both W&L Law
Class of 2014, and helpful comments from Christopher Bruner and Lyman Johnson.
1. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corpo-
rate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (taking issue with the principal-agent model of corporate
governance and the shareholder wealth maximization objective).
2. See generally Andrew Johnston, Facing up to Social Cost: The Real Meaning of Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 221 (2011) (arguing that the label corporate social
responsibility should be reserved for the process by which corporations voluntarily identify and
correct the social costs of their operations).
3. The literature on corporate social responsibility is vast. See, e.g., THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the
social and ethical responsibilities of business).
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owes them a duty to maximize the return on their investments.4 This gener-
ally means maximization of current value to shareholders, even at the ex-
pense of possibly greater long-term value. Agents do not act as diligently
for their principals as they do when they are working for themselves be-
cause as agents they do not capture the full value of their efforts. This slack
and the expenses incurred by shareholders in attempting to monitor the per-
formance of their agents are termed “agency costs.” According to this ver-
sion of shareholder primacy, therefore, the key problem for corporate law is
to minimize agency costs so as to maximize shareholder wealth. There is a
difference of opinion among scholars committed to this model as to whether
corporate law should more effectively empower shareholders to exert pres-
sure on management to perform optimally or whether instead market mech-
anisms reduce agency costs to acceptable levels, obviating the need for law
reform. While they might disagree about the extent to which law is needed,
proponents of radical shareholder primacy—who include most of the big-
gest names in the corporate law academy—all accept the agency characteri-
zation and the shareholder wealth maximization injunction.5
Radical shareholder primacy differs from another version of share-
holder primacy, which I term “traditional shareholder primacy.” This model
also claims to privilege shareholders, but its commitment to them is signifi-
cantly weaker than under the radical version. Under the traditional model,
which emerged in the last years of the nineteenth century and was embod-
ied in corporate law and widely accepted for much of the twentieth century,
management enjoys broad discretion and is largely immune from share-
holder control.6 While it is assumed that a business corporation is organized
in order to generate profit and, as a practical matter, a corporation that regu-
larly loses money cannot survive long-term, there is no expectation that
management must maximize current share price to the exclusion of compet-
ing objectives. These can include regard for the interests of non-shareholder
constituencies under circumstances management deems to be appropriate,
as well as long-term investments that reduce current earnings for the sake of
future gains. Certainly there is no sense that an agency relationship exists
between management and shareholders. The normative boost to shareholder
empowerment that the agency idea provides, therefore, is lacking under the
traditional model.
This article begins in Part I with a brief history of the emergence of the
“shareholder primacy” idea, a term that appears in U.S. law reviews only at
the very end of the 1980s. Part II then explains the origins of the radical
shareholder primacy concept at the University of Chicago Law School in
the late 1970s, before the advent of the term “shareholder primacy.” The
4. See infra text accompanying notes 22–31.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 32–40.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 41–55.
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key notion is the assertion of an agency relationship between management
and shareholders, which contrasts with the traditional, significantly more
modest version of shareholder primacy accepted for much of the twentieth
century. Part III then surveys the status of radical shareholder primacy to-
day. Though not grounded in legal doctrine, its agency idea and the focus
on agency costs shapes much of today’s prominent corporate law scholar-
ship. It is also observed in actual business practice, though not as a direct
result of the work of its academic partisans. Rather, social norms cultivated
in the leading business schools, in board rooms, and in the business press,
coupled with strong pressure from institutional shareholders, lead corporate
management to behave as if it is the agent of the shareholders and as such is
obliged to maximize current share price to the exclusion of competing
objectives.
I. “SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY” IN THE LAW REVIEWS
The term “shareholder primacy” first appears in the law reviews in
early 1989, in articles published contemporaneously by me and my friend
and Washington and Lee colleague Lyman Johnson. He and I had been
discussing the idea of shareholder primacy and employing that phrase in our
daily conversations about current corporate law topics, particularly the pol-
icy challenges presented by the then high incidence of hostile takeover ac-
tivity. My paper included a discussion of the emergence during the early
twentieth century of the idea that “management’s broad discretion with re-
spect to conduct of corporate affairs must be exercised solely for the benefit
of the shareholders.”7 Professor Johnson’s article, cited in my piece, ana-
lyzed the emerging disjunction between state judicial and legislative regula-
tion of target management responses to hostile takeovers.8 We analyzed the
shareholder primacy idea extensively in a co-authored article published in
1989.9 We continued to use the term in a number of subsequent publica-
tions, some co-authored,10 some written individually.11
7. David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 903, 904 (1988). See also id. at 918 (referring to “the requirement that management dili-
gently devote itself to maximizing shareholder wealth rather than other possibly conflicting objec-
tives”). Patrick Ryan’s article, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate
Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 173 (1988), published very soon after mine, used the term “share-
holder primacy” in passing on the seventy-sixth page of an eighty-seven-page article. There may
have been earlier uses of the term in books as opposed to law review articles but, if so, we were
then and are now unaware of them.
8. Lyman Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target
Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. L. 35 (1988).
9. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862,
1899–1907 (1989).
10. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing to the Point about State Takeover
Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 848 (1989); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Does the Williams
Act Preempt State Common Law in Hostile Takeovers?, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 339, 353 (1989);
Lyman Johnson & David Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 BUS. LAW. 2105, 2116 (1990);
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Since then, the term “shareholder primacy” has become a basic ele-
ment of corporate law discourse. It is used routinely in academic discus-
sions about corporate purpose and about the appropriate beneficiaries of
management’s discretion. This is the case not only among U.S. scholars12
but abroad as well.13
In one of our early articles, Professor Johnson and I explained that the
shareholder primacy idea is subject to two quite different interpretations.14
The core notion is that shareholder interests should dominate competing
claims by other stakeholders, but corporate law can operationalize that idea
in either of two ways. On the one hand, the shareholder primacy idea can
serve as an injunction to management, defining its duty in relation to the
corporation’s various stakeholders. As such, shareholder primacy instructs
management to prioritize shareholder interests over competing non-share-
holder interests. In that article, we referred to this as the “shareholder pro-
tection” version of shareholder primacy.15 Corporate law promotes
shareholder financial interests by defining management’s obligations with
reference to them. The relation between management and shareholder is
roughly equivalent to that between a trustee and its beneficiaries, with the
trustee enjoying broad power and discretion to advance the beneficiaries’
interests and the beneficiaries themselves being essentially passive.
Alternatively, the shareholder primacy idea can lead to the view that
shareholders should themselves be able to decide important questions re-
garding their economic interests. We referred to this as the “shareholder
Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and Corporate Law: Who’s in Control?,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1993).
11. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life
and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 871 (1990); Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corpo-
rate Stock, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 485, 489 (1991); Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sover-
eignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215 (1992); Lyman Johnson, New
Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1713, 1713 (1993); David Millon, Theo-
ries of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 220–25; David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law,
24 IND. L. REV. 223, 225 (1991); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis
in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1993).
12. See, e.g., Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43
SETON HALL L. REV. 909 (2013); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the
Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Argu-
ments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002); Gregory Scott Crespi, Rethink-
ing Corporate Fiduciary Duties: The Inefficiency of the Shareholder Primacy Norm, 55 SMU L.
REV. 141 (2002); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Paul Kru¨ger Andersen & Evelyne J. B. Sørensen, The Principle of Shareholder
Primacy in Company Law from a Nordic and European Regulatory Perspective, in THE EURO-
PEAN FINANCIAL MARKET IN TRANSITION (Hanne Birkmose, Mette Neville & Karsten Engsig
Sørensen eds., 2011); Malcolm Anderson et al., Shareholder Primacy and Directors’ Duties: An
Australian Perspective, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 161 (2008); Paddy Ireland, Shareholder Primacy and
the Distribution of Wealth, 68 MOD. L. REV. 49 (2005) (U.K.); John Armour, Simon Deakin &
Suzanne Konzelmann, Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41
BRIT. J. OF INDUS. REL. 531 (2003) (U.K.).
14. Johnson & Millon, supra note 9, at 1882–86.
15. Id. at 1883.
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autonomy” version of shareholder primacy.16 According to this view, share-
holders should be able to exert pressure on management to maximize their
financial interests and should have the power to replace underperformers.
There is a loose analogy to the principal-agent relation.
Professor Johnson and I illustrated this distinction with reference to
differing judicial interpretations of the federal Williams Act’s17 regulation
of target company management’s power to resist hostile takeovers.18 One
might argue that shareholders of the target ought to enjoy the right to decide
for themselves whether to accept the consideration offered to them by the
hostile bidder. This can be seen as a matter of personal autonomy and the
right of a property owner to decide whether and on what terms to dispose of
his or her property, here corporate stock. Alternatively, defensive measures
denying shareholders that choice might be justified on the ground that man-
agement knows better than the shareholders themselves about the long-term
value of their shares; therefore, shareholders need to be protected from mis-
takenly reaching for the seductive but actually inadequate premium offered
by the bidder. These approaches have very different implications for the
question of managerial authority, but each can be grounded on the share-
holder primacy idea.19
In today’s corporate law discourse, the “shareholder protection” ver-
sion of shareholder primacy resonates with Professor Stephen Bainbridge’s
“director primacy” theory of corporate law.20 According to this view, the
corporation’s board of directors’ job is to pursue shareholder wealth max-
imization, but the board possesses broad discretion with respect to the
means to that end and is largely immune from direct shareholder control.
Bainbridge argues that his conception accurately describes the current state
of the law; he also asserts that it is desirable from a normative point of view
because of the value of managerial discretion.
As explained in the next section, what I term the radical version of
shareholder primacy amounts to an extreme version of the “shareholder au-
tonomy” conception of the balance of power between management and
shareholders. The emphasis is on the shareholders’ right to more directly
influence corporate direction and policy. Professor Lucian Bebchuk’s
“shareholder empowerment” agenda exemplifies this position, taking for
16. Id.
17. Willams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended by Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)) (requiring disclosure of informa-
tion regarding cash tender offers and providing procedural protections for offerees).
18. Johnson & Millon, supra note 9, at 1882–89.
19. Note also that defensive measures might be justified with reference to a duty to protect
non-shareholders or to protect the “corporate enterprise” as an entity.
20. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Gov-
ernance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (exploring the basic concepts of director primacy).
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granted that shareholders should possess the ability to demand of manage-
ment that it act according to their preferences.21
II. RADICAL SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
A. Radical Versus Traditional Shareholder Primacy
1. The Agency Idea
The key feature of radical shareholder primacy is its description of the
relation between shareholders and management in terms of agency. Corpo-
rate management acts as the agent of a principal, which collectively is the
company’s shareholders. This means that management’s job is to act on
behalf of the shareholders, using its managerial authority to advance their
interests. No such agency relation exists as to the corporation’s other stake-
holders, such as employees, creditors, suppliers, and customers. As to them,
management’s sole responsibilities are to honor contractual obligations and
to observe relevant legal rules that regulate those relationships. Nor is there
any more general duty to society as a whole.
As the agent, management’s duty is to maximize the shareholders’ re-
turn on their investments in the corporation. This means maximization of
the value of their residual claims on the corporation’s assets and revenues,
which ordinarily requires maximization of corporate profits. The maximiza-
tion injunction is assumed even though it does not necessarily follow from
the agency idea that management must advance shareholder financial inter-
ests to the fullest extent possible. An agent’s job is simply to perform the
task defined by the principal, acting on his or her behalf.22 In the corporate
context that could mean various things, such as realizing a “reasonable”
return on investment while fostering productive, efficiency-enhancing rela-
tionships with other stakeholders. Or it could mean promotion of the long-
term sustainability of the corporate enterprise. Moreover, radical share-
holder primacy assumes a unitary body of shareholders all having the same
interest in maximizing financial return.
Radical shareholder primacy posits further that the principal has the
authority to determine the relevant time horizon within which shareholder
wealth maximization is to occur. As explained more fully below,23 today’s
institutional shareholders, who dominate the stock markets, tend to focus
sharply on quarterly accounting results as the relevant benchmark for a cor-
poration’s financial performance. A corporation’s failure to reach earnings
targets can result in large-scale sell-offs and consequent declines in share
prices.24 If share price falls too far, executives face the prospect of job
21. See infra text accompanying notes 32–37.
22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 146–47.
24. See, e.g., Douglas J. Skinner & Richard G. Sloan, Earnings Surprises, Growth Expecta-
tions, and Stock Returns or Don’t Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio, 7 REV. ACCT.
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loss,25 pay cuts,26 or reduced bonuses.27 Equity-based compensation
schemes also encourage an emphasis on share price.28 Corporate manage-
ment therefore confronts strong incentives to concentrate on quarterly re-
sults. This can mean a willingness to forego expenditures that reduce
earnings in the short-term even though there may be potential long-term
pay-offs.29 From the perspective of radical shareholder primacy, manage-
ment would violate its duty as agent of the shareholders if it were to pursue
some other objective that had the effect of reducing quarterly earnings, such
as the long-run sustainability of the corporation or some kind of social re-
sponsibility agenda.
By relying on agents to maximize the financial return on their invest-
ments, shareholders face the inevitable fact that management will not
devote itself as fully to their interests as it would if it were itself to reap the
full benefits of its efforts. Management may use its position to divert corpo-
rate assets to itself, or it may simply put forth less than optimal effort. In
either case, shareholders earn less than they would if their agent performed
its work with greater fidelity and commitment. Shareholders, therefore,
must monitor the activities of management, either themselves or relying on
other agents. Management may also attempt to provide guarantees (or
“bonds”) that it will act in the shareholders’ best interests. Drawing on eco-
nomic analysis,30 legal theorists use the term “agency costs” to describe the
sum of the lost value that is inherent in any agency relationship, together
with the additional costs of monitoring by shareholders and bonding by
management.31
2. Normative Implications
Viewed from this agency cost perspective, the primary role of corpo-
rate law is to enhance management’s accountability to the shareholders.
Ideally, accountability should provide the incentives needed to ensure that
management acts in the best interests of the shareholders, defined according
to the shareholders’ preferences. Traditionally, corporate law has addressed
STUD. 289 (2002) (providing research showing that “growth” or “glamour” stocks produce a much
larger negative response to earnings disappointments than other stocks).
25. John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40
J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 28 (2005) (quoting an executive as saying, “I miss the target, I’m out of a
job.”).
26. See Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregory D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay
in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 695 (2011) (indicating that
CEO terminations can be linked to share price performance).
27. Steven R. Matsunaga & Chul W. Park, The Effect of Missing a Quarterly Earnings
Benchmark on the CEO’s Annual Bonus, 76 ACCT. REV. 313 (2001).
28. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 26, at 695–97.
29. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 25, at 32–35.
30. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
31. See infra text accompanying note 96.
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this problem in two ways. First, it imposes legal duties on management—
expressed in terms of open-ended fiduciary duties of care and loyalty—that
are enforceable by the shareholders through derivative actions. The prospect
of personal liability for careless or deliberate wrongdoing ought to discour-
age those kinds of misbehavior. Second, corporate law also confers on the
shareholders the power to replace the board of directors (which appoints
and monitors the corporation’s senior officers) through the annual electoral
process. Here the threat of job loss should deter shirking or dishonesty.
For proponents of radical shareholder primacy, the question then be-
comes whether these existing accountability mechanisms adequately mini-
mize the costs of the agency relationship. No one claims that shareholder
voting rights or fiduciary duties enforceable by derivative suits are fully
sufficient by themselves to minimize agency costs. Due to the high costs
involved in mobilizing shareholder support, it is exceedingly difficult to
oust incumbent management via the annual election; actual challenges
therefore are rare.32 Fiduciary duties are difficult to enforce for a number of
reasons. The business judgment rule insulates directors from liability except
in cases of self-dealing or deliberate disregard of duty.33 Exculpation provi-
sions included in most corporate charters eliminate money damages liability
for duty of care breaches by directors.34 The derivative action’s demand
requirement presents a substantial hurdle to shareholder litigation.35
Some scholars therefore argue for law reforms that would provide
shareholders with greater power vis-a`-vis management. For example, Pro-
fessor Bebchuk advocates conferring on shareholders the power to initiate
structural changes to the balance of power between shareholders and man-
agement.36 These could include the elimination of staggered boards or
reincorporation in a state that provides shareholders with stronger govern-
ance authority or remedies for management misconduct. Under current law,
shareholders lack the power to initiate reincorporation or amendment to the
articles of incorporation. Bebchuk also argues for empowerment of share-
holders with respect to certain decisions to merge or dissolve a corporation
or to distribute cash or other assets to the shareholders. Such power would
counteract management’s typical bias in favor of maintaining the corpora-
tion’s existence and retaining its earnings within the corporate treasury.
Bebchuk and others have also proposed that shareholders seeking to chal-
lenge management at the annual meeting should be able to propose rival
32. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43,
45–46 (2003).
33. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 269 (2002).
34. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013) (providing for opt-in exculpa-
tory provisions in articles of incorporation).
35. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 33, at 393.
36. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833 (2005).
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nominees for inclusion in management’s proxy solicitation materials, a
change that could greatly reduce the costs of proxy solicitation contests.37
Others who see management as the shareholders’ agent acknowledge
existing corporate law’s limitations as a mechanism for reducing agency
costs, but assert the efficiency of the current legal regime based on its near
universal adoption as the framework of choice for organization of large-
scale production. From this perspective, the “separation between ownership
and control” characteristic of publicly held corporations—despite the at-
tendant agency cost problem—flourishes because it reflects an efficient di-
vision of labor, allowing those with capital but without managerial expertise
or inclination to invest in a number of different firms while leaving mana-
gerial functions to full-time business professionals.38 Rather than calling for
legal reform designed to confer greater power on shareholders to monitor
and discipline management and participate in decision making, these schol-
ars are more likely to emphasize the importance of existing non-legal incen-
tives as mechanisms for reducing agency costs to efficient levels. These
include product or service markets, which demand managerial diligence in
order to avoid firm failure, and the market for executive employment,
which rewards corporate managers for strong performance and punishes
them for sub-par results. Equity-based compensation arrangements, widely
used, align the interests of senior officers with the shareholders’ desire for
high stock prices. Perhaps most important, the “market for corporate con-
trol” could encourage current share price maximization in order to discour-
age potential hostile takeovers that would result in displacement of
incumbent management.39 Here, though, corporate law has evolved in ways
that effectively shield management from unsolicited changes in control. Ac-
cordingly, even those scholars who are disinclined to favor legal interven-
tion in markets advocate law reform that would stimulate an active takeover
market.40
3. Traditional Shareholder Primacy
In contrast to what I term “radical shareholder primacy” is another
model, which I term “traditional shareholder primacy.” Under the tradi-
37. Bebchuk, supra note 32, at 47. Note that much of the shareholder empowerment agenda
is already present in U.K. corporate law. See Christopher M. Bruner, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER ch. 3 (2013).
38. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 11 (1991) (describing the separation of risk bearing from management).
39. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110,
113 (1965).
40. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Manage-
ment in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1194–1204 (1981) (arguing for a
rule of managerial passivity when confronted with a tender offer); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 819, 865–90 (1981) (advocating “role allocation rule” to address concerns about the alloca-
tion of authority between management and shareholders).
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tional conception of shareholder primacy, one does not find the relationship
between management and shareholders described in terms of agency. This
different perspective was the dominant way of thinking about corporate
governance from the turn of the twentieth century until the advent of radical
shareholder primacy, which as I explain below is of quite recent origin.
Under traditional shareholder primacy, the agency characterization is
descriptively inaccurate because of corporate law’s assignment of broad
discretion to management and its weak commitment to accountability to
shareholders. For purposes of the comparison I seek to draw here, it is the
nearly complete inability of the shareholders to control management that
bears primary emphasis. As discussed above, voting rights and fiduciary
duties exert pressure on management only in cases of severe incompetence
or obvious malfeasance. In Professor Bainbridge’s words, “Shareholder
control rights are so weak that they scarcely qualify as part of corporate
governance.”41 Hostile takeovers—a potentially powerful tool for holding
management accountable to shareholders—do not pose a serious threat be-
cause of the broad power conferred by the Delaware judiciary on incumbent
management to resist unwelcome challenges to its control.42
In light of the corporate law’s systematic disempowerment of share-
holders, it makes no sense to describe their relationship to management in
terms of agency because one of the essential attributes of an agency rela-
tionship is the principal’s right of control over the actions of the agent. This
is stated clearly in the most recent Restatement of the law of agency,43 as it
was in the Restatement’s previous two incarnations.44 Law professors fa-
miliar with agency law reject the relevance of the legal idea of agency to the
relationship between shareholders and management.45 Professor Victor
Brudney also notes that dispersed shareholders lack the knowledge of man-
41. Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 569.
42. The Unocal and Time/Warner decisions in particular confer broad discretion on corporate
management to resist hostile overtures that are inconsistent with management’s vision for the
corporation’s future. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The Revlon case does impose a
duty on management to maximize current share price, but it is important to appreciate that the
circumstances in which the Revlon duty applies only arise as a result of a voluntary decision by
management to initiate an auction, to sell the company to a buyer that will break it up, or to enter
into a change of control transaction. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637
A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary relationship
that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the
agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent
manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1(1); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 1.
45. See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 56–59 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985);
Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1403, 1428–30 (1985).
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agement’s conduct and the firm’s performance necessary for exercise of
control even if they were inclined to do so and possessed the necessary
legal tools.46
Not only do shareholders lack the control powers that are at the heart
of a true agency relationship, it is not even clear that management’s duty is
to maximize shareholder wealth. As discussed more fully below,47 there is
virtually no statutory or common law authority for that claim. Even the oft-
cited Dodge v. Ford case, the standard and often the only citation offered
for the maximization claim, does not on its face demand maximization.48
As far as shareholder primacy is concerned, the best that can be made of
that decision is the principle that management may not prioritize non-share-
holder interests over those of shareholders. In any event, the case is anoma-
lous and has had no significant influence on Delaware corporate law.
In light of the descriptive inaccuracy of the agency characterization,
normative claims that are readily assumed to follow from the agency idea
are problematic and controversial. Law reform proposals that seek to
strengthen the position of shareholders in relation to management cannot
rest solely on the idea that management is the agent of the shareholders.
The shareholder empowerment agenda of Professor Bebchuk and others
needs a different justification, which typically is not forthcoming. So too
does the critique of Delaware law authorizing defensive tactics against hos-
tile takeovers, which is based on the idea that the threat of an unsolicited
tender offer encourages management to maximize current share price.49
The traditional model’s commitment to managerial accountability is so
weak that some would reject the suggestion that this amounts to shareholder
primacy at all. Notably, Professor Bainbridge uses the term “director pri-
macy” to describe the traditional legal model, emphasizing the expansive
governance authority of the board of directors and the shareholders’ corre-
sponding impotence.50 As a descriptive matter, he is surely correct on the
question of the primary locus of power within the corporation as between
management and shareholders. Indeed, managerial discretion, broadly even
if not entirely shielded from shareholder oversight, is arguably the founda-
tional principle of Delaware corporate law.
Even if shareholder primacy does not accurately express the balance of
power between shareholders and management, it nevertheless still makes
sense to use the term shareholder primacy to describe the traditional model
46. Brudney, supra note 45, at 1429–30.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 120–34.
48. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
49. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 40; Gilson, supra note 40; Lucian A.
Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982);
Jonathan R. Macey, Auction Theory, MBOs, and Property Rights in Corporate Assets, 25 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 85 (1990).
50. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Gov-
ernance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550–52 (2003).
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as long as one is clear about what one is talking about. Shareholders do
enjoy a special place within the corporate governance structure in relation
to its other constituencies or stakeholders. Shareholders alone elect direc-
tors except in extraordinary circumstances. They alone have a right of ac-
cess, albeit limited, to corporate books and records including the list of
shareholders. Only shareholders can bring derivative lawsuits against direc-
tors or officers to redress harm done to the corporation. They are singled
out for special mention in Delaware’s traditional specification of fiduciary
duties being owed to “the corporation and its shareholders.”51 Shareholders
are commonly, even if inaccurately, referred to as the “owners” of the
corporation.52
These features of corporate law, singling out shareholders for special
status among the corporation’s various stakeholders, are vestiges of old,
long since discarded conceptions of the legal status of the corporation’s
shareholders. At least until the middle of the nineteenth century, most busi-
nesses were operated as sole proprietorships or partnerships.53 Firms organ-
ized as corporations because of capital needs generally were closely held
and employed one or a few salaried managers.54 Because of these corpora-
tions’ functional similarities to partnerships, it was plausible as a descrip-
tive matter to analogize shareholders’ governance authority and property
rights within the corporation to those of partners in a general partnership.55
The shareholders, or at least a majority of them, typically participated di-
rectly in control over the business’ activities and enjoyed the legal right to
do so. As owners of the firm’s assets, they could at least loosely be de-
scribed as “owners” of the corporation. And it made sense to describe man-
agers, directors, and lower-level employees who worked for the business as
the shareholders’ agents because the idea of the corporation as a distinct
legal person (and therefore as the agents’ principal) was not yet well
established.56
Ironically, therefore, during much of the nineteenth century the agency
characterization of the relation between managers and shareholders was le-
gally accurate. By the end of the century, however, as corporations grew in
size and complexity and the number of their shareholders increased, the
51. Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d sub nom. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5
A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
52. Bainbridge, supra note 33, at 29; Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for
Shareholder Primacy, 75 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190-92 (2002).
53. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND 36, 50 (1977).
54. Id. at 37, 41–42, 48, 60, 68.
55. Similar ideas animated thinking about nineteenth-century English corporate law. See
Jonathan Mukwiri, Myth of Shareholder Primacy, 24 EUROPEAN BUS. L. REV. 217 (2013); Paddy
Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership, 62 MODERN L. REV. 32 (1999).
56. Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 11, at 213–14. Earlier in the nineteenth
century, courts and commentators had noted that corporations differed from partnerships in requir-
ing an act of the state for their formation, but this did not lead to claims that corporations rather
than their shareholders were principals under the law of agency.
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now well-known separation between ownership and control became in-
creasingly typical.57 Corporate law and legal theory adjusted to the fact that
most shareholders no longer had the expertise or the inclination to partici-
pate directly in control of the business or exercise supervision over those
who were responsible for control. Most notably, the relation between share-
holders and management was reconceived such that the powers of the board
of directors were now said to be “original and undelegated,”58 an express
repudiation of the older idea that shareholders conferred authority on direc-
tors.59 It followed from this that the directors were now deemed to be
agents of the corporation as a legal person rather than of the shareholders,60
an idea that itself depended on a developed theory of the corporation as an
entity existing separately from its shareholders.61 The relationship between
directors and shareholders was reconceived in terms of trusteeship rather
than agency,62 signaling a shift from shareholder control to managerial dis-
cretion. The development of the business judgment rule further enhanced
managerial autonomy at the expense of accountability to shareholders.63
Voting and informational rights survived as vestiges of an older age when
shareholders, like partners, controlled their firms, even as these traditional
mechanisms lost much of their practical significance. If the agency concep-
tion of the relation between management and shareholders lost currency in
the early years of the twentieth century, where did radical shareholder pri-
macy’s agency model came from?
B. The Recent Origins of Radical Shareholder Primacy
Radical shareholder primacy originated at the University of Chicago
Law School during the later 1970s. As such it was part of the remarkably
rapid emergence and spread of Law and Economics at Chicago. While
economists had taught at the Law School for decades, Chicago scholars
began systematically to apply economic analysis to virtually all areas of law
after the arrival at Chicago of Professor (now Judge) Richard Posner in
57. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
58. See, e.g., Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 322 (1918); People ex rel. Manice v. Powell,
201 N.Y. 194 (1911); Hoyt v. Thompson’s Ex’r, 19 N.Y. 207, 216 (1859).
59. See Sabrina Bruno, Directors’ Versus Shareholders’ Primacy in U.S. Corporations
Through the Eyes of History: Is Directors’ Power “Inherent”?, 9 EUROPEAN COMPANY & FIN. L.
REV. 421, 431–34 (2012) (explaining prevalence of view of directors as agents of shareholders in
nineteenth-century U.S. law).
60. See, e.g., Dixmoor Golf Club, Inc., v. Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 616 (1927); People ex rel.
Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 200 (1911); Beveridge v. N.Y. El. R. Co., 112 N.Y. 1, 22–23
(1889).
61. Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 11, at 215.
62. See, e.g., Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 226 N.Y. 185, 193 (1919); Powell, 201 N.Y. at
200–01; Cass v. Manchester Iron & Steel Co., 9 F. 640, 642 (W.D. Pa. 1881).
63. See Rodman Ward & Paul J. Lockwood, Corporate Law, in DELAWARE SUPREME COURT
GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951–2001 82 (R. Holland & H. Winslow eds., 2001) (tracing origins of
business judgment rule concept).
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1969 and the publication of the first edition of his landmark Economic
Analysis of Law in 1973.64 In the field of corporate law, the key players
were Professor Daniel Fischel and Professor (now Judge) Frank Easter-
brook. First Fischel, and then Easterbrook and Fischel writing together, ar-
ticulated the idea that management is the agent of the shareholders and then
assumed its foundational relevance for their analysis of the entire field of
corporate law. Importantly, they drew the agency idea—and the key con-
cept of agency cost—not from corporate law itself, but rather from the field
of financial economics. Since then, the agency idea and the focus on agency
costs as corporate law’s central problem have been taken for granted by
most economically-oriented corporate law scholars despite the absence of
an actual legal mandate.
1. Law and Economics at Chicago
Long before the emergence of Law and Economics at the University of
Chicago Law School as a distinctive approach to the analysis of legal rules
and institutions, there was already a long tradition of economists teaching at
the Law School.65 In 1933, Aaron Director and Henry Simons began offer-
ing courses in economics.66 By 1939, Simons had been appointed to the law
school faculty and Director received a similar appointment in 1946.67 Later,
renowned economists Gary Becker, Ronald Coase, Milton Friedman, and
George Stigler would also teach at the Law School.68
The “new” Law and Economics is generally said to have emerged
around 1960.69 Scholars at the University of Chicago’s Economics Depart-
ment and Law School played a pivotal role.70 Coase’s article The Problem
of Social Cost71 could be read as arguing that private contracting efficiently
resolves externality problems as long as property rights are adequately
specified and there are no transaction costs.72 The article was important not
only for its novel analysis and its attention to the importance of transaction
costs but more generally because it illustrated how economic analysis might
illuminate elements of private law.
64. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1973).
65. Robin I. Mordfin & Marsha Ferziger Nagorsky, Chicago and Law and Economics: A
History, THE RECORD ONLINE (Fall 2011), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/maga
zine/fall11/lawandecon-history (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
66. Id. at 1.
67. Id. at 2.
68. Id. at 2–5.
69. Herbert Hovenkamp, Law and Economics in the United States: A Brief Historical Survey,
19 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 331, 334 (1995); Ejan Mackaay, History of Law and Economics, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 65, 72 (1999); Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach
to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 759 (1975).
70. Hovenkamp, supra note 69, at 334.
71. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
72. Hovenkamp, supra note 69, at 334–35.
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A focus on the efficiency of legal rules, procedures, and institutions
contrasted with an earlier Law and Economics movement, a robust tradition
of economic analysis of legal policy that flourished during the Progressive
Era.73 Later, after World War II, a number of economists studied the influ-
ence of law on the operation of markets.74 Coase described this work as the
study of “the effect that the working of the legal system has on the working
of the economic system.”75 Focusing on the impact of law on markets, this
research tended to concentrate on areas such as antitrust, utility and com-
mon career regulation, labor law, and taxation.76
Posner’s initial contribution was to show that it was possible to apply
economic analysis to virtually any area of law. Acknowledging the influ-
ence of Becker, Posner saw that neoclassical economics offers a set of tools
that can illuminate most areas of human existence.77 With respect to law,
Posner effectively reoriented Law and Economics from the study of mar-
kets to the question of the efficiency of legal rules, procedures, and institu-
tions, deploying economic analysis over a remarkably wide range of subject
areas. The first edition of Economic Analysis of Law applied economics to
virtually every area of public and private law, effectively encouraging eco-
nomically-oriented scholars to pursue research in whatever substantive area
of law they might be interested in.78 For this reason, Posner’s long-time
Chicago colleague Professor Richard Epstein, himself a leading practitioner
of Law and Economics, describes the first edition as “a manifesto [because
it] brought economic analysis to nearly every area of law.”79
Taking up Posner’s challenge, in the wake of the publication of the
first edition of Economic Analysis of Law Posner and his Chicago col-
leagues produced a broad and rich panoply of law review articles applying
economic analysis to various legal areas. Writing by himself,80 with econo-
73. Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law and Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV.
993, 1031–58 (1990).
74. See, e.g., Sophie Harnay & Alain Marciano, Posner, Economics and the Law: From ‘Law
and Economics’ to an Economic Analysis of Law, 31 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 215 (2009) (dis-
cussing Posner’s economic analysis of the law and its antecedents).
75. Richard A. Epstein et al., The Roundtable Discussion, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1138
(1997).
76. Posner, supra note 69, at 758.
77. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 AMER. ECON. REV. 1
(1987).
78. POSNER, supra note 64.
79. Mordfin & Nagorsky, supra note 65, at 4.
80. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 399 (1973); Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affili-
ated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. Rev. 499 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in
Economics and Law, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 411 (1977); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of
Privacy, 2 REGULATION 19 (1978); Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON.
REV. 405 (1981); Richard A. Posner, Toward an Economic Theory of Federal Jurisdiction, 6
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 41 (1982).
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mist William Landes,81 a member of the Law School faculty, and with
others,82 Posner published a number of papers on a range of substantive and
procedural topics. Other Chicago colleagues wrote about torts,83 con-
tracts,84 civil procedure,85 patent law,86 privacy,87 and international trade.88
2. Economic Analysis of the Corporation
As Chicago professors were at work applying economics to a wide
array of legal topics, it was to be expected that someone would turn to
corporate law. Daniel Fischel took the lead, using cutting edge economic
theory to analyze the legal regulation of hostile takeovers in an article pub-
lished in the Texas Law Review in 1978.89 Fischel had graduated from the
University of Chicago Law School only a year earlier, where he had com-
piled an outstanding academic record.90 Following graduation he clerked
for Chief Judge Thomas E. Fairchild on the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit and then for Justice Potter Stewart on the United
States Supreme Court. After a year of private practice in Chicago, he joined
81. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.
LEG. STUD. 1 (1975); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875 (1976); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. L. & ECON. 249 (1976);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescu-
ers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 83 (1978); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 235 (1979); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Joint and Mujltiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEG.
STUD. 517 (1980); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior,
and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. L. STUD. 367 (1980); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1981).
82. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemak-
ing, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 257 (1974); Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and
Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 83 (1977).
83. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151 (1973);
Richard A. Epstein, Defense and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEG. STUD.
165 (1974); Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 391 (1975); Alan O. Sykes,
The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule
and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988).
84. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Con-
tracts, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1978); Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.
351 (1978).
85. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and
Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 47 (1975); Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule
68, 15 J. LEG. STUD. 93 (1986).
86. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON.
265 (1977).
87. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Privacy and the Optimal Extent of Disclosure under the Free-
dom of Information Act, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 775 (1980).
88. See Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 199 (1989).
89. Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control,
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978).
90. Daniel R. Fischel, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
faculty/fischel (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
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the faculty of the Northwestern University School of Law, returning to the
University of Chicago as a faculty member and director of the Law and
Economics Program in January 1984. Fischel later served as dean of the
Law School.
In his 1978 Texas Law Review article, Fischel criticized federal and
state law that interfered with hostile takeovers.91 Relying on the efficient
capital market theory, Fischel asserted that share prices accurately reflect all
public information about a corporation’s current performance and future
prospects.92 The stock of poorly managed companies, therefore, would
trade at a lower price than it would if more competent managers were run-
ning the same company. This presented an opportunity for an outsider to
acquire a controlling interest at the depressed price, replace the incumbent
management team with a better one, and thereby boost the share price and
make a profit.93 This would not only result in more efficient utilization of
the target corporations’ assets; the very threat of a hostile takeover would
motivate all managers to do what they could to achieve optimal perform-
ance in order to maximize current share price and thereby discourage hos-
tile tender offers.94
Fischel was not the first to argue that a robust market for corporate
control would be beneficial for shareholders, both those of companies
targeted for takeover and also those that were not. Professor (later Dean)
Henry Manne had suggested as much in an article published in 1965.95 Fis-
chel’s contribution was to argue in detail that the Williams Act96 and state
legislation regulating hostile takeovers, together with the defensive mea-
sures available to target company management, “frustrate the effective
functioning of the market for corporate control to the detriment of all
shareholders.”97
Fischel’s argument assumed that the interests of shareholders were the
primary criterion by which to evaluate the functioning of the hostile take-
over market. This was by no means obvious. Other metrics exist that can
justify restrictions on the ability of bidders to seize control of target compa-
nies. According to the Delaware Supreme Court, the harmful effects of hos-
tile takeovers on employees, creditors, local communities, and other non-
91. Fischel, supra note 89, at 9–45.
92. See id. at 4.
93. See id. at 4–5.
94. See id. at 4.
95. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110, 112–13 (1965).
96. Willams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended by Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)) (requiring mandatory disclosure
of information regarding cash tender offers and providing procedural protections for offerees).
97. Fischel, supra note 89, at 2.
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shareholder constituencies might warrant defensive measures.98 The same
court has also emphasized the importance of managerial discretion to deter-
mine the corporation’s future.99 Hostile tender offers can present a conflict
between the power of management and shareholders; if allowed free rein to
accept a bidder’s offer, the shareholders can in effect decide the corpora-
tion’s future by accepting an offer from a bidder that intends to change the
company’s capital structure or strategic direction. According to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, this is a power that management may not delegate to
the shareholders by stepping aside and letting them decide for themselves
how to respond to a hostile bid.100
In Fischel’s view, the focus on shareholder financial interests to the
exclusion of other conflicting values was based on his claim that corporate
managers were the agents of the shareholder principals.101 Unlike a closely-
held firm, in which the owners of the corporation’s stock (or at least some
of them) were typically directly involved in management of the company,
publicly held corporations were characterized by what Berle and Means had
referred to as a separation between ownership and control.102 The “owners”
of the corporation did not exercise control over it.103 Viewed from this per-
spective, the functional division between provision of capital and active
management of the business implied that shareholders had delegated mana-
gerial authority to the board of directors and senior officers, who were
therefore expected to act on the shareholders’ behalf. Although it does not
necessarily follow from the fact of separation itself, this presumed agency
relationship was taken to entail that management’s duty is to maximize
shareholder wealth.
Reliance on this agency relationship was potentially costly to the
shareholder principals. Unlike a business owner who runs the firm himself
or herself, managers of publicly held companies do not gain the full benefits
of hard work or bear the full costs of subpar effort. This inevitable diver-
gence of interest between managers and shareholders was a cost borne by
shareholders, who also incurred monitoring costs. Fischel referred to the
sum of these costs, plus bonding expenditures by management, as the “costs
of the agency relationship.”104
Fischel emphasized that the market for corporate control was particu-
larly important “in creating incentives for management to maximize the
98. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (holding that direc-
tors may oppose a tender offer in order to protect the corporate enterprise).
99. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
100. Id. at 1154.
101. Fischel, supra note 89, at 4.
102. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 57, at 4.
103. Common as it is, it is a misnomer to refer to the shareholders as the “owners” of the
corporation or of its property. The most that can be said accurately is that they own the corpora-
tion’s stock.
104. Fischel, supra note 89, at 25 n.26.
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welfare of shareholders.”105 Various other market mechanisms also oper-
ated to minimize agency costs.106 Management had reputational incentives
to perform well in order to increase the demand for their services. Com-
monly used equity-based compensation arrangements, such as stock op-
tions, aligned the interests of managers and shareholders, and competition
in product markets likewise encouraged effective management.
Fischel seemed to take for granted the characterization of management
as agents of the shareholder principals, even though there is no legal justifi-
cation for it. Senior officers and the board of directors are agents of the
corporation, not of the shareholders,107 and their fiduciary obligations run to
“the corporation and its shareholders,” not to the shareholders alone.108
Nor, as noted above, do shareholders enjoy the legal right or the practical
power to control management, a hallmark of an authentic agency relation-
ship.109 Received opinion also tended to emphasize managerial autonomy
from shareholder control, the central feature of the “managerialist” model
of corporate governance that was ascendant for much of the twentieth
century.110
Fischel’s introduction of the agency idea was rapidly assimilated
among leading corporate law scholars. Agency costs emerged as the central
problem for corporate law. Fischel’s analysis deserves to be seen as an im-
portant and surprising innovation in legal scholarship. It would not be hy-
perbole to suggest that it was revolutionary. Where did the agency idea
come from?
Fischel drew the agency idea from then recent scholarship in financial
economics. The key source was an article published only two years earlier
by two Chicago-trained economists, Professor Michael Jensen and Profes-
sor (later Dean) William Meckling.111 In the Chicago Law School environ-
ment, energized by Law and Economics’ rapid infiltration of virtually all
areas of law, it is no surprise that Fischel would have turned to cutting edge,
Chicago-influenced financial economics literature to illuminate the legal
problem he was interested in. He was one of the first law professors to cite
this article in a law review.112
105. Id. at 4.
106. Id. at 4–5.
107. For discussion of the agency status of officers, see Lyman Johnson & David Millon,
Recalling Why Corporate Officers are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005).
108. Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d sub nom. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5
A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
109. Supra text accompanying notes 43–44.
110. See, e.g., CHANDLER, supra note 53, at 484–500 (1977) (describing the history of man-
agement for much of the twentieth century); PETER F. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT
(1954) (discussing management’s role post-World War II).
111. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
112. See also Leon Gabinet & Ronald J. Coffey, The Implications of the Economic Concept of
Income for Corporation-Shareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 895,
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As economists, it does not appear that Jensen and Meckling had in
mind the legal relation of principal and agent.113 They defined an agency
relationship more loosely, as one in which one or more persons (the princi-
pals) engage another (the agent) “to perform some service on their behalf
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.”114
According to them, the relationship between shareholders and corporate
management “fit [sic] the definition of a pure agency relationship.”115 No
legal authority for the characterization was cited; nor was there any effort to
demonstrate how as a matter of actual practice shareholders had the power
to control management or might be thought to have “engaged” corporate
management to work on their behalf. Jensen and Meckling seem instead to
have been thinking more generally of situations in which one person acts on
behalf of another. These can be agency relationships in the eyes of the law
if other attributes are present—particularly the power of control, the pres-
ence of consent, and fiduciary obligation—but they need not be. Impor-
tantly, however, they took for granted an idea shared by most financial
economists, the belief that corporate management’s primary responsibility
is to maximize shareholder wealth. This assumption appears to have been
grounded in traditional ideas about shareholder property rights and more
recent, widely held disapproval of the broad discretion characteristic of the
“managerialist” model of corporate governance.116
While Jensen and Meckling appeared to use the term agency in the
non-legal sense of “acting on behalf of,” once legal academics appropriated
the agency idea in this context it took on a life of its own and became the
foundation of what I am terming “radical shareholder primacy.” Fischel and
those who came after him seem to have taken the agency idea more seri-
ously than it was intended in the economics literature. From a traditional
legal perspective, the agency characterization implied a relationship in
which the shareholders, as principals, enjoyed the power to control manage-
ment, the agent. It also implied fiduciary obligation running from manage-
ment directly to the shareholders and to them alone. This perspective
provided normative leverage wherever law or practice seemed to disadvan-
tage shareholder financial interests. It also made it inevitable that agency
costs would be seen as a problem of central relevance.
Following Fischel’s introduction of the agency idea to the legal acad-
emy in his 1978 Texas Law Review piece, Fischel then went on to co-au-
thor, with Professor Easterbrook, a series of important articles applying the
agency cost framework to a broad range of corporate law topics. Easter-
903 n.30 (1977); Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 758 n.61 (1978).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 43–44.
114. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 111, at 308.
115. Id. at 309.
116. See RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS 317–18 (2007).
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brook had also graduated from the University of Chicago Law School, in
1973, and had been a member of the faculty since 1978.117 Prior to his
collaboration with Fischel, his previous work had been in antitrust, privacy,
and civil procedure.118 The first of the articles co-authored with Fischel was
a widely cited piece advocating target management passivity in the face of
hostile takeovers published in the Harvard Law Review in 1981.119 Succes-
sive articles, some co-authored, some published independently, culminated
in the publication in 1991 of their book The Economic Structure of Corpo-
rate Law.120 This is certainly, along with Berle and Means’ Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property,121 one of the two most influential books about
corporate law published during the twentieth century. Describing the corpo-
ration as a nexus of contracts and viewing management as agent of the
shareholders obligated to maximize shareholder wealth, the Easterbrook
and Fischel vision of the corporation and corporate law has largely defined
the agenda for mainstream, economically-oriented corporate law scholar-
ship. As noted above, there is disagreement about the actual magnitude of
agency costs and how best to reduce them, but the agency cost problem as a
drag on shareholder wealth maximization is widely assumed to be the cen-
tral question for corporate law scholarship.
The nexus-of-contracts theory of the corporation views corporations as
nothing more than webs of contracts among the firm’s various constituents,
who include managers and lower-level employees, shareholders, lenders,
suppliers of materials, and others.122 The primary point is to reject the idea
that a corporation is an “entity” of some kind existing separately from the
people who constitute it through their contractual interrelationships.123
Though of central importance to their subsequent work, the nexus-of-con-
tracts idea was not present in Fischel’s and Easterbrook’s earliest articles.
Fischel first referred to the idea in 1982, citing an article published by Uni-
versity of Chicago economist Eugene Fama published in 1980.124 As with
117. Frank H. Easterbrook, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.uchicago
.edu/faculty/easterbrook (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
118. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Due Process in Selective Service Appeals, 39 U.
CHI. L. REV. 331 (1972); Frank H. Easterbrook, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential Competi-
tion Doctrine, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 156 (1972); Frank H. Easterbrook, William M. Landes, and
Richard A. Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23
J. L. & ECON. 331 (1980); Easterbrook, supra note 87.
119. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 40.
120. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAW (1991). For a critical assessment, see Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sover-
eignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215 (1992).
121. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 57.
122. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 33, at 27–33.
123. Id. at 27.
124. Daniel R. Fischel, The ‘Race to the Bottom’ Revisited: Reflections on Recent Develop-
ments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 917 & n.26, 918 & n.27 (1982)
(citing Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 290
(1980)). See also Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV.
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Jensen and Meckling’s Theory of the Firm article,125 Fischel again was a
pioneer in drawing upon cutting edge economics literature to illuminate
questions of corporate law.126
The nexus-of-contracts theory added weight to the agency conception
of the relation between shareholders and corporate management. According
to the contractual theory, shareholders, as passive investors in several dif-
ferent firms lacking the incentives or the expertise to engage in manage-
ment themselves, rely on professional managers to maximize the returns on
their investments.127 Conceiving of the relationship in contractual terms
strengthens the idea that management’s job is to promote the shareholders’
financial interests. Rejection of the notion of the “corporation” as anything
more than a “legal fiction”128 also neatly disposes of the possibility that
management might owe duties to the corporate entity rather than simply to
the shareholders. The language of voluntary assent also implies that the
arrangements that structure business activity in the corporate form are effi-
cient. Therefore, legal intervention, in the form of corporate governance
reform or external regulation, is at least presumptively undesirable.
III. RADICAL SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY’S CURRENT IMPORTANCE
A. Radical Shareholder Primacy in the Academy
There is no legal authority for the radical shareholder primacy concep-
tion of the relationship between corporate management and the company’s
shareholders. As noted above, corporate law’s specification of the share-
holders’ power vis-a`-vis management does not fit the legal definition of an
agency relationship, which emphasizes the power of control.129 While the
current legal regime often is sufficient to subject managers of small-scale,
closely held corporations to actual shareholder control (in the typical case
some or all of the managers are shareholders themselves), that is not the
case with respect to publicly held entities characterized by a separation be-
tween ownership and control. As corporations have grown in scale and
complexity and shareholders have been transformed into passive investors
relying on professional managers, corporate law has not evolved in ways
that empower shareholders to exercise direct control over those on whom
they are dependent for their financial returns.
1259, 1264 n.15 (1982) (citing Fama article); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust
Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177 n.58 (1982) (citing Fama article).
125. Jenson & Meckling, supra note 111.
126. Fischel was not the first to cite the Fama article in a law review. Professor Ronald Gilson
had already done so in an article published in 1981. See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach
to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 836
n.67, 837 n.69, 838 n.72, 841 n.85 (1981) (citing Fama, supra note 124).
127. Fischel, supra note 124, at 918.
128. Id. at 917.
129. See supra text accompanying note 43–44.
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Delaware corporate law, the most influential body of law for United
States publicly held corporations, does not reflect an agency model. Direc-
tors’ fiduciary duties are owed not to the shareholders alone, but rather to
“the corporation and its shareholders.”130 Vague as this formulation might
be, it does not express the notion of management as the agent of the share-
holders as principals. In any event, the demand requirement applicable to
shareholder derivative suits, the business judgment rule, and the statutory
provision for exculpation of monetary liability for breach of the duty of
care,131 as a practical matter, insulates management from accountability to
shareholders except, in cases involving conflict of interest or bad faith. As
currently structured, the voting rights regime does not seriously threaten
incumbent management because of collective action costs and rational apa-
thy that discourage coordinated shareholder insurgency. Nor does the pros-
pect of a hostile takeover create a strong incentive to maximize share
values; Delaware common law accords target company management broad
discretion to defend against hostile takeovers. The Revlon duty132 to maxi-
mize current share value arises only in a narrow range of circumstances that
corporate management is free to avoid if it so wishes,133 and in practice
presents virtually no threat of liability for breach.134
Not only is the agency idea at the heart of radical shareholder primacy
absent from Delaware corporate law, the traditional model does not man-
date shareholder wealth maximization. Delaware precedent to that effect is
virtually nonexistent. One recent trial court opinion does speak of share-
holder primacy as a statutory mandate.135 In deciding eBay’s suit against
Craigslist, Chancellor Chandler states that, “Having chosen a for-profit cor-
porate form, the Craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and
standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to pro-
mote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”136
Corporate policies that seek “not to maximize the economic value of a for-
profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders” are inva-
lid.137 In other words, not only must corporate management pursue share-
130. Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d sub nom. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5
A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013).
132. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1994)
(stating “[t]he duty of the board . . . [is] the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the
stockholders’ benefit”).
133. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46–48 (Del. 1994)
(mandating “enhanced scrutiny and the directors’ obligation to seek the best value reasonably
available for the stockholders [arises] where there is a pending sale of control”).
134. Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167
(2014).
135. eBay Domestic Hldgs., Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 26 (Del. Ch. 2010). For a critique of
this opinion, see Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment
Rule and Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 439–44 (2013).
136. eBay Domestic Hldgs., Inc., 16 A.3d at 34.
137. Id.
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holder value, it must also seek to maximize the shareholders’ financial
interests. Apparently the court believes these assertions to be self-evidently
true because it cites no statutory provision or case law in support of them.
In fact, the Delaware corporation statute includes no such mandate and does
not refer to corporations organized under it as “for-profit” entities. To the
contrary, the statute states that “A corporation may be incorporated or or-
ganized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or
purposes.”138 Nor has a Delaware court ever endorsed shareholder wealth
maximization in the stark terms used by the court in this case.139
Further, the court’s endorsement of shareholder primacy in the Craig-
slist case may have very limited relevance. The facts of the case were ec-
centric; read narrowly, the opinion endorses the shareholder primacy idea in
a highly unusual case involving a closely held corporation whose founders
had explicitly chosen to eschew profit in order to pursue a social mission.
Thus the opinion might be read simply to condemn corporate policies that
are entirely and expressly contrary to shareholder financial interests. Such
circumstances are rare to say the least. Companies pursuing social missions
at the expense of shareholder value are far more likely to sacrifice some
amount of profit without rejecting that objective entirely, and are likely also
to justify such policies with reference to long-run shareholder financial in-
terests, even if the claim is vague and not susceptible to proof. Under the
business judgment rule, policies of this kind would not be condemned even
if shareholder primacy were the law.140 It should be noted further that even
a narrow reading of the court’s endorsement of shareholder primacy is quite
problematic. eBay, the plaintiff minority shareholder, invested in Craigslist
with full knowledge that profit-seeking (let alone profit maximization) was
not that corporation’s objective. This was not, in other words, a case in
which those in control of a for-profit corporation chose to change direction
to the prejudice of existing minority shareholders. Rather, one might argue
that eBay implicitly assented to Craiglist’s disavowal of shareholder pri-
macy when it invested with knowledge of the founders’ social mission.
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2013).
139. One trial court opinion states that “[i]t is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the
law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation’s stockholders.” Katz v. Oak Indus.
Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986). However, this case involved the contractual rights of
bondholders and as such does not speak to the question of shareholder primacy. Further, the
reference to the shareholders’ “long-run interests” does not imply a duty to maximize current
share price and is vague enough, when combined with the business judgment rule, to confer very
broad discretion on management to balance a range of shareholder and nonshareholder interests in
promoting the corporation’s long-run sustainability.
140. Elsewhere in the Craigslist opinion, Chancellor Chandler writes, “When director deci-
sions are reviewed under the business judgment rule, this Court will not question rational judg-
ments about how promoting non-stockholder interests—be it through making a charitable
contribution, paying employees higher salaries and benefits, or more general norms like promot-
ing a particular corporate culture—ultimately promote stockholder value.” eBay Domestic Hold-
ings, 16 A.3d at 33.
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The typical citation for the shareholder primacy proposition is, of
course, the Dodge v. Ford case, a 1919 decision of the Michigan Supreme
Court.141 That decision, without citing precedent, states that “A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the benefit of the
stockholders. The powers of directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that
end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself.”142 Despite the fre-
quency with which the case is cited by commentators, no Delaware court
has cited it as authority for the shareholder primacy principle.143 The gen-
eral statement quoted here also is not necessary to the decision of the case,
which appears to be a case involving oppression of minority shareholders in
a closely held corporation. This was arguably a case in which the control-
ling shareholder adopted a policy to forego some (but not all) profits and
their distribution in favor of conflicting social objectives, to the detriment
of legitimate minority shareholder expectations. The shareholder primacy
idea need not be invoked to protect minority shareholders in such cases.
Further, the Dodge v. Ford decision may simply be wrong. There is no
plausible claim that Henry Ford was using his control of the corporation to
treat the plaintiff Dodge brothers unfairly. Even after adoption of Ford’s
new policies, the Dodge brothers were to continue to receive annual divi-
dends of $120,000 on an initial investment of $200,000, an astonishingly
rich annual return of 60 percent.144 Further, although the corporation was
earning profits far in excess of the planned distributions and might have
earned even more in the short term, the corporation’s management had cho-
sen to reinvest a large share of those profits in new capital assets. This
sounds on the face of it like the kind of decision that the business judgment
rule ought to have protected.
Even if the Dodge v. Ford decision does properly stand for the share-
holder primacy principle, there is no indication in the opinion that manage-
ment’s relation to the shareholders should be conceived of in terms of
agency or that maximization is required. To the contrary, the quoted lan-
guage and the result are consistent with the traditional model of shareholder
primacy. Nothing suggests that management is the shareholders’ agent and
therefore should be subject to their control. Management is supposed to
prioritize shareholder interests but it enjoys discretion as to the means to
that end, largely immune from direct supervision by the shareholders.
Under this view, courts would come to the shareholders’ aid only in ex-
141. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
142. Id. at 684.
143. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 27 (2012) (disputing the claim that
corporate law mandates shareholder primacy).
144. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683. In addition to the regular dividends of 60 percent, from 1911
through 1915 the Dodge brothers also received special dividends totaling $3.6 million.
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treme cases, of which the Michigan Supreme Court seems to have thought
Dodge v. Ford was an example.
Despite the absence of a legal mandate, the radical shareholder pri-
macy idea is broadly embraced within the legal academy, especially among
corporate law scholars at the leading law schools. For example, two schol-
ars have recently written that:
The shareholder value framework for analyzing corporate law and
governance implies that those running a corporation should seek
to maximize the value of the shareholders’ claims, as measured
by the stock price. This norm, which we refer to as ‘shareholder
value,’ is adopted as a way of rendering those controlling a public
company accountable to shareholders . . . . The concern is . . . that
the firm will be run in the interests of its managers, rather than its
owners . . . . The shareholder value norm thus responds to the
‘agency problem’ between managers and diversified
shareholders.145
Professor Bebchuk, whose shareholder empowerment agenda receives
widespread attention, is probably the best known of those scholars seeking
to enhance managerial subservience to shareholders through law reform.146
A number of other prominent scholars—all approaching corporate law is-
sues from a law-and-economics perspective—also share the assumption that
shareholder wealth maximization is management’s primary responsibility
and that the agency cost problem is the central intellectual and practical
problem for corporate law.147 Differences of opinion exist as to the need for
law reform of the type that Bebchuk advocates. Some scholars incline to-
ward the view that market forces—including product market competition,
the executive employment market, compensation incentives, and even the
possibility of hostile takeovers—are generally sufficient to mitigate the
agency cost problem.148
145. John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value 1–2 (Eur.
Corp. Gvrnce. Inst., Working Paper No. 222, 2013). The authors state that the shareholder value
norm “has acquired an almost axiomatic status in discussions about corporate governance.” Id. at
2.
146. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675
(2007) (documenting unsuccessful challenges to corporate management from 1996 to 2004); Lu-
cian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006) (advocating
greater shareholder power to amend charter or change state of incorporation); Bebchuk, supra
note 36 (arguing that shareholders should be able to make “rules-of-the-game decisions” affecting
the state of the corporation); Bebchuk, supra note 32 (discussing obstacles shareholders face in
using voting rights to replace directors).
147. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (examining recent dominance of a shareholder-centered ideology among
government, business, and legal elites in major commercial jurisdictions); Ronald J. Gilson &
Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete
Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231 (2008); Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Share-
holder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907 (2013).
148. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323–25 (1986) (discussing the use of leveraged buyouts to
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Not all advocates of shareholder primacy embrace the agency model.
Professor Bainbridge is well known for his arguments in favor of “director
primacy.”149 While Bainbridge argues that management’s primary responsi-
bility is to maximize shareholder wealth, he rejects the notion that share-
holders ought to be able to exercise direct control over managerial decision
making.150 With respect to the board of director’s autonomy, Bainbridge’s
model thus resembles what I have termed “traditional shareholder pri-
macy.” It differs, however, to the extent that it mandates shareholder wealth
maximization. The traditional model includes no such mandate.
Some prominent scholars reject the shareholder primacy claim. Profes-
sor Lynn Stout has argued this position effectively, both normatively and
also as a description of the current state of corporate law.151 With Professor
Margaret Blair, Stout has also maintained that management’s job is to me-
diate among the, at times, conflicting interests of those of the corporation’s
various stakeholders who have invested financial or human capital in the
firm.152 With respect to shareholder primacy, Professor Einer Elhauge
writes, “Corporate managers have never had an enforceable legal duty to
maximize corporate profits. Rather, they have always had some legal dis-
cretion (implicit or explicit) to sacrifice corporate profits in the public inter-
est.”153 So-called corporate law progressives or communitarians reject
shareholder wealth maximization as a legal requirement and also on norma-
tive grounds.154 Recently, two prominent economically-oriented legal
scholars have argued that shareholder primacy is socially undesirable for
systemically important financial firms, even if not necessarily for all corpo-
rations.155 Nevertheless, despite these and other dissenting voices and its
non-existent legal underpinnings, the agency cost problem—based implic-
itly on the assumption that management is the shareholders’ agent—is gen-
erally seen to provide “the dominant framework of analysis for corporate
law and corporate governance today.”156
reduce agency costs); David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation
of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 452–59 (2000) (examining use of executive
stock options to combat agency costs).
149. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Govern-
ance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550–52 (2003).
150. Id. at 551.
151. See STOUT, supra note 143, at 7–11.
152. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 250–52 (1999).
153. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interests, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 738 (2005).
154. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
LAW 185–219 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
155. Armour & Gordon, supra note 145, at 2–3.
156. Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 1325, 1326 (2013).
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B. Business Practice
Beyond the academy, there appears to exist a widely held belief that
management’s job is to cater to the preferences of shareholders. For many
large institutional shareholders, that generally means that management
should maximize current share price. In the current environment share price
movements are closely linked to a corporation’s quarterly earnings perform-
ance. Corporate management finds itself under pressure to meet earnings
targets and therefore typically focuses on short-term accounting results,
even at the expense of long-run value. Market forces and social norms seem
to be the primary drivers of shareholder expectations and management be-
havior. To the extent that attention is paid to the law, there may be an
assumption that shareholder primacy is a legal mandate and some may em-
brace the agency idea at the core of radical shareholder primacy. But mis-
taken beliefs about the law seem to be of only secondary importance.
Institutional shareholders dominate today’s stock markets. Public and
private pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, foundations,
university endowments, and bank trust departments together own on the
order of three-quarters of the stock of the one thousand largest U.S. corpo-
rations.157 For some major companies, the percentage is even higher.158
Many of these shareholders pursue short-term investment strategies, hold-
ing shares in a broad range of companies and trading frequently in order to
realize gains in share price or to unload shares whose prices have declined.
The average holding period may now be as low as five months.159 Quarterly
earnings announcements have taken on special importance because a corpo-
ration’s failure to meet analysts’ targets can trigger large-scale sell-offs and
corresponding share price decreases. Short-term accounting results thus
take priority over study of underlying fundamentals and concerns about
possible disjunctions between current share price and long-run value. Al-
though some shareholders do pursue more patient investment strategies,
short-termism seems increasingly to be the norm among major
institutions.160
Short-term oriented investors assume tacitly that management acts ap-
propriately when it prioritizes preferences for current share price maximiza-
tion over other potentially competing objectives. This assumption does not
seem to be based on a mistaken belief in the shareholders’ legal right to
command management’s attention. Rather, preferences for short-term re-
157. David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 913
(2013).
158. Id.
159. John C. Bogle, Restoring Faith in Financial Markets, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2010), http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703s436504574640523013840290.
160. Id. (“[T]he folly of short-term speculation has replaced the wisdom of long-term invest-
ing”); see also Dominic Barton, Capitalism for the Long Term, HARV. BUS. REV. 84, 87–88
(2011) (criticizing “quarterly capitalism”).
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sults and corresponding pressures on management to achieve them appear
to arise primarily from economic and legal pressures to which many major
institutional shareholders are subject.161 Public and private pension funds
confront current obligations to their retirees. For example, the California
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), the largest U.S. public
pension fund, must make monthly payments averaging over $2,600 to over
half a million people, with contingent liabilities to over a million more.162
Thus, while pension funds must necessarily take a long view in light of
anticipated retirements continuing to occur regularly far into the future, they
face significant pressures to meet their legal obligations to their retirees
each month. Historically, public pension funds have assumed an annual rate
of return on their investment portfolios of 8 percent, but since the financial
crisis this has become harder to count on.163 This only adds to existing
incentives to pursue short-term investment strategies in order to meet cur-
rent obligations. Even less than previously, these shareholders do not have
the luxury of waiting patiently for long-term business strategies to bear
fruit.
Many mutual funds also face significant incentives to insist on corpo-
rate pursuit of short-term investment strategies.164 Mutual fund fees are typ-
ically a function of total assets under management, meaning that fund
owners increase their compensation through successful competition for in-
vestor dollars. Investors typically respond to short-term, year-to-year fund
performance in making decisions about where to invest their money, and
may also withdraw their money in cases of poor performance. Fund manag-
ers face the prospect of reduced compensation or even termination if they
do not achieve acceptable results and therefore adjust their trading strate-
gies accordingly. For example, managers who are behind their year-end
targets at six months are likely to trade aggressively during the second half
of the year, chasing riskier short-term returns.165
Large shareholders seeking short-term returns can put pressure on cor-
porate management to achieve acceptable results in a number of ways.
Large-scale sell-offs in response to disappointing quarterly earnings reports
can result in sharp share price declines, which in turn can lead to a CEO’s
termination166 or decreased compensation.167 More activist investors may
161. See Millon, supra note 157, at 914–18 (providing a full discussion of this phenomenon).
162. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEE’S RETIREMENT SYTEM, Facts at a Glance, 1, 6 (updated
Nov. 30, 2013) http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eipdocs/about/facts/facts-at-a-glance.pdf.
163. Mary Williams Walsh, Public Pension Funds are Adding Risk to Raise Returns, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/business/09pension.html?pagewanted
=all&_r=0.
164. See Millon, supra note 157, at 934–36.
165. Keith C. Brown, W. V. Harlow & Laura T. Starks, Of Tournaments and Temptations: An
Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry, 51 J. FIN. 85, 103–04 (1996).
166. Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, Performance-Induced CEO Turnover 2–5 (Feb. 2010)
(working paper).
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choose to put pressure on boards to remove senior executives who fail to
produce acceptable quarterly results.168 Others may attempt to use voting
rights or shareholder proposals.169
In addition to direct or indirect pressure from shareholders, corporate
management is also subject to other incentives that have the effect of en-
couraging them to behave as if they were the agents of the shareholders.
Widely used equity-based compensation arrangements address the agency
cost problem by aligning the interests of management with those of the
shareholders.170 A strong record of quarterly performance can also create
reputational pay-offs.171 More generally, a widely held social norm may
encourage corporate management to think of itself as the agent of the share-
holders.172 Leading business schools teach what amounts to radical share-
holder primacy’s agency model of the relation between management and
shareholders.173 The business press typically views this question in a simi-
lar vein.174
To a large extent, business practice and discourse embrace the radical
shareholder primacy idea that management is the agent of the shareholders,
and is thus charged with doing their bidding. This is apparent in the behav-
ior of many shareholders, including some very powerful ones, and also in
the approach commonly taken by the management of many major corpora-
tions. I do not claim that the emergence of radical shareholder primacy in
the legal academy at the University of Chicago in the later 1970s, spreading
from there to the rest of the leading law schools, was the kernel from which
developments in the business world sprouted. The story is far more com-
plex than that. Radical shareholder primacy in the law schools is probably
part of a larger ideological, economic, and socio-political phenomenon that
now shapes and legitimates business practice in powerful ways. That com-
plex but hugely important story has yet to be told.
167. Steven R. Matsunaga & Chul W. Park, The Effect of Missing a Quarterly Earnings
Benchmark on the CEO’s Annual Bonus, 76 ACCT. REV. 313, 330–31 (2001).
168. Barton, supra note 160, at 87.
169. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and
the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective, 13 J. APPLIED FIN. 4, 10 (2003).
170. See Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in
Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 680 (2011).
171. John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of
Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 28 (2005).
172. See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 143, at 113 (referring to “the business world’s own intellec-
tual embrace of shareholder value ideology”).
173. See KHURANA, supra note 116, at 317–26.
174. See, e.g., Aneel Karnani, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 23, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870333800457523011266
4504890.
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CONCLUSION
The agency model of the relation between management and sharehold-
ers enjoys broad currency among corporate executives and major sharehold-
ers. I term this view radical shareholder primacy because it makes an
extreme claim about management’s responsibility and shareholders’ rights.
This model is also widely—though not universally—embraced by legal
academics. As an academic theory, radical shareholder primacy’s agency
theory—and preoccupation with the so-called agency cost problem—is a
recent innovation, tracing its origins only to the later 1970s at the Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School.
Radical shareholder primacy’s conception of corporate governance
contrasts with an older, long-established model that I term traditional share-
holder primacy. It should be kept in mind that referring to this model as
“shareholder primacy” is misleading because that phrase does not appear in
the law reviews until 1989, in articles published contemporaneously by me
and my friend and Washington and Lee colleague Lyman Johnson, gaining
widespread currency thereafter. It is also misleading to the extent that it
suggests that shareholders have meaningful powers of control over manage-
ment. To the contrary, the hallmark of traditional shareholder primacy is the
nearly complete absence of such powers. This lack of accountability has
been a central feature of corporate law and practice since the later nine-
teenth century, when the emergence of a separation between ownership and
control led to the legal and theoretical reconceptualization of management’s
relation to the shareholders. The term shareholder primacy in the traditional
sense is also potentially misleading to the extent that it might be taken to
imply a duty to maximize shareholders’ financial returns. The traditional
model did not include such an injunction. As far as shareholder primacy
within the traditional model is concerned, the most that could be said was
that shareholders could claim a special place among the corporation’s vari-
ous constituencies by virtue of their voting rights, rights of inspection, and
right to bring derivative lawsuits to enforce corporate claims. By the turn of
the twentieth century these were little more than vestiges of an earlier age
when shareholders actually did control the business. There was a general
expectation that business corporations should earn profits—they could
hardly survive if they didn’t—but there was no actual legal mandate even as
to that. In any event, corporate law accorded management broad discretion
as to how to pursue that objective and effectively conferred on it the free-
dom to temper profit seeking with competing values. This it might choose
to do in order to enhance the corporation’s long-term economic prospects,
but it was also free to do so in order to act as a “good citizen.”
All this amounts to shareholder primacy in only a very modest sense of
the term. However accurate it might have been in the earlier nineteenth
century in an age of closely held firms, an agency characterization of man-
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agement’s relation to the shareholders has been completely inaccurate as a
descriptive matter since the turn of the twentieth century and was still so in
the later 1970s when corporate law academics first began to insist on it.
Against this backdrop, the emergence of the agency claim and its wide-
spread embrace as an assumed legal requirement are nothing short of
astonishing.
Understanding the distinction between the radical and traditional mod-
els of shareholder primacy is important because it sheds light on the other-
wise puzzling fact that corporate law academics disagree on the truly
fundamental question of whether shareholder primacy is the foundational
principle of corporate law in the United States. Those who say no are im-
plicitly rejecting the agency characterization and they are right, but they are
wrong to insist that shareholder primacy has no place in traditional thinking
about corporate law. It does, but only in a very modest sense. If agency
theory were laid to rest, there would be no harm in accepting that fact and
perhaps resistance to it would dissipate. Meanwhile, the opposing camp is
wrong to insist on the agency idea but correct to the extent that corporate
law has always accorded shareholders a privileged governance position in
relation to other stakeholders, even as it has done little to facilitate actual
shareholder control. In other words, academics arguing about shareholder
primacy are actually talking about two different things, lacking a clear
sense of the distinction between them.
Appreciation of the two meanings of shareholder primacy—and the
recent origins and non-existent legal basis for the radical version—is also
important for another reason. Once it is understood that the agency model is
aspirational rather than grounded in corporate law, a more serious conversa-
tion about corporate purpose and the desirable balance of power between
management and shareholders can occur. Perhaps the severe social costs of
excessive commitment to short-term share price maximization—one lesson
of the recent financial crisis—will be sufficient to counter calls for in-
creased shareholder power and managerial accountability.
